Supreme Court Opinions in Land and Estate Cases

[…] The cloud supposed to be cast upon plaintiff's title by the assertion of a claim to said land through said deed to Nora Daniels upon the supposition that the deed executed by her did not divest her of title. Defendants answered by a special plea and prayed that their title be decreed perfect. There was a judgment for plaintiff in the trial court, which was affirmed on appeal to the court of civil appeals.

First. We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in its first conclusion of law to the effect that the heirs of Nora Daniels were estopped. She did nothing more than execute and deliver the deed and probably receive the purchase money.

If the mere execution of a deed and the receipt of the purchase money constitute an estoppel, then in all cases, though a married woman has no capacity to convey by a deed wherein she is not [...], nevertheless the deed and its subsequent recording by the purchaser would pass title by estoppel. This would virtually remove the disability of coverture. Such a rule has never been recognized in this state.

Second. We have many times held that a bona fide purchaser for value, from the holder of the legal title who has capacity to contract, will be protected against the undisclosed equity of another in the thing conveyed. But the proposition here asserted is, that a bona fide purchaser for value from the holder of the legal title who has no capacity to contract, will be protected against subsequent claims of such vendor or his heirs, seeking to avoid the binding force of such contract by reason of such want of capacity, on the ground that such purchaser had no notice of such want of capacity. [...] Under the rules of the law merchant, which manifest so much solicitude for the protection of a bona fide holder for value of negotiable paper, this protection is not afforded. (Dan. on Neg. Ins., sections 806 and 807.)

Reversed and remanded. Opinion by Denman, J.

T. A. Minter et al. vs. S. B. Burnett, administrator, et al.; certified questions in a case from Wichita county, Second district. Answered in favor of appellants:

Jerry J. Burnett died intestate in Wichita county on August 7, 1894, and left surviving him his wife, Jesse Burnett, his father Jerry Burnett, and five brothers and sisters. He left no children. At the date of his death he owned four tracts of land in Wichita county. There was a vendor's lien against this land to secure the payment of the balance due for the purchase price. He also owned a one-half interest in certain cattle then in the Indian Territory, which interest was sold by his surviving partner soon after the death of Burnett and the proceeds, amounting to $9000, brought into this state. Subsequently to this, S. B. Burnett was duly appointed administrator of the estate.

On April 22, 1896, the administrator made application to the county court for an order to sell certain real estate for the purpose of paying the debts therein mentioned, which constituted vendor's liens upon said lands. At this date the administrator had on hand, in addition to the land mentioned, personal property and cash to the amount of $9000. Outside the funds in the hands of the administrator derived from the sale of the cattle in the Indian Territory, there was no personal property in his hands out of which he could raise money to pay off said debts or any part thereof. The application for the order to sell the land was contested by the father and brothers and sisters of deceased, and approved by the widow. The order was issued, after trial in the county court, and upon appeal to the district court and trial de novo the same order was made.

Question 1. "Did the application of the administrator for the sale of the land and the proof show any necessity for such sale?"

First. Under the common law, if the deceased was not personally liable to the mortgagee or other lien holder for the debt secured upon the land, then the personal property could not be applied to its satisfaction. But if a person died and left land incumbered for a debt for which he was personally liable, then the personal estate of such decedent was liable as the primary fund to discharge the debt so secured and the heir or devisee who received the land from the deceased would have the right to insist upon the application of the personal property to its payment.

In bringing a case within this rule, it was not necessary that the paramount title to the land should be in the vendee. It was sufficient if the contract was such that the vendee could be compelled to take the land.

In our opinion there is nothing in our statutes which provides a rule different from that of the common law in relation to the relative rights of the parties who, under the circumstances of this case, receive the estate of the deceased, either by will or inheritance. We conclude, therefore, that the rules of the common law are in force in this state as to the rights of the parties involved in the question submitted.

Second. We do not think that the fact that the money in the hands of the administrator was derived from the sale of property beyond the limits of the state, is of any importance in the case.

We, therefore, answer that the application for the sale of the land, under the facts of this case, did not show a necessity for such sale, and that the father, brothers and sisters of the deceased Jerry J. Burnett are entitled, as between themselves, the administrator and the widow, to have the purchase money for the land paid out of the funds in the hands of the administrator derived from the sale of such personal property.

Opinion by Brown, J.